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J.: Public Utilities--Discontinuation of Service
CASE COMMENTS

Another view in respect to the determination of the heirs or next
of kin when there is a postponed gift, in remainder or as a substitute
gift, is that the class is to be determined as of the death of the life
tenant though this can not be truly said to be a gift to the heirs of
one who died other than at the death of the life tenant. New York
Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 237 N.Y. 93, 142 N.E. 431, 31
A.L.R. 791 (1923). This view was apparently followed in National
Bank v. Kenney, 113 W. Va. 890, 170 S.E. 177 (1933). However,
in the Kenney case, there was an express condition of survivorship
as to the primary class gift and the court stated that this condition
of survivorship applied equally as well to the substitutional class
gift in favor of the testatrix's heirs, thus holding that only the heirs
who survive the life tenant should take.
The principal case has suggested by inference at Icast a third
possible view, i.e., the heirs who will take are determhic when it
conclusively appears that the heirs will take regardless of the fact
that this happened neither at the testators death nor at the termination of the final life estate (the time of distribution) but in the
interim.
It is submitted that while the decision in the principal case was
satisfactory from a practical point of view, yet the court should have
taken a more positive position in order to establish a precedent for
situations in the nature of the one above suggested, so that one may
more clearly and with preciseness predict what the law will be.
G. H. A.

Punic UTmrs-DscoNTIrNmcE

OF

SEavCE.-P filed a peti-

tion with the Public Service Commission praying authority to discontinue the furnishing of passenger service over its branch line
between Elkins and Durbin, West Virginia. The commission entered
an order granting in part the relief prayed for, but ordered that P
continue furnishing passenger service three days per week. Held,
that, where no public need for such service exists and a substantial
loss is suffered by the carrier in the furnishing of such service,
authority to discontinue the service should be granted. Western
Maryland Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 106 S.E.2d 923 (W. Va.
1959).
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In this state, railroad companies, because their corporate existence
emanates from the public, owe to it in return therefor certain duties,
the performance of which they cannot evade. Such duties have
always existed. They were not created by statute, but are considered common law duties. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Public Serv.
Comnn, 75 W. Va. 100, 121 S.E. 924, (1914).
The principal case brings into issue the question whether this
duty owed. to the public by railroads is an unqualified duty; that
is, must a railroad furnish passenger service to any group of citizens
who demand it, or may consideration be given by the Public Service
Commission and the courts to pecuniary loss, among other things,
to the railroad and discontinue any service where the railroad sustains a heavy financial loss?
This comment does not deal with the scope of power of the
Public Service Commission. It is sufficient to note that an order
of the Public Service Commission will not be reviewed by the
supreme court unless it shows unlawful, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power. Bluefield Telephone Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 102
W. Va. 296, 135 S.E. 833 (1926). In the principal case the court
clearly pointed out that the ruling of the commission was made in
such manner and thus warranted review.
Past West Virginia decisions are somewhat in conflict as to when
service may be ordered discontinued by the commission. One of
the more prominent cases on this subject is Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra. In that case, the main ground of
the complaint with the order of the commission arose from the
probable inadequacy of returns from rendering passenger service
on a branch line. It was contended that operating expenses would
exceed the revenue derived from the service. The court said that
to hold as the railroad contends would operate as a valid excuse for
the refusal of personal transportation. The result of a comparison
of expenses with prospective returns is not controlling.
It was also held in Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
90 W. Va. 1, 110 S.E. 475 (1922), that an enforced discharge by a
railroad of its duty to provide reasonably adequate facilities for
serving the public does not amount to a taking of property without
compensation contrary to the fourteenth amendment or the constitution of West Virginia merely because it is attended with some
expense.
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In the case of Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 78
W. Va. 667, 89 S.E. 844 (1916), it was held that an order of the
Public Service Commission directing a carrier of passengers to
furnish an extra service cannot be held unreasonable because it will
impose pecuniary loss on the carrier, but the carrier's entire intrastate earnings from its passenger travel must be taken into account.
However, the court appeared to give great weight to pecuniary
loss by the railroad in Collins v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 94 W. Va. 455,
119 S.E. 288 (1923), where it held, "this court will not suspend the
action of the Public Service Commission, whereby it discontinues
certain passenger trains, operated by a railroad on two branch lines,
where the facts show that the continuance of said trains will be of
great pecuniary loss to the company." However, the additional factor
of other available public transportation was considered by the court
in reaching this decision.
The holdings in the earlier West Virginia cases are open to the
objection of making Peter pay for Paul's ride. It is obviously unfair
to make one patron of a railroad pay part of the fare of another, and
that is precisely the result reached in the earlier cases, but avoided
by the Collins case. Peairs, The West Virginia Public Service Commission, 46 W. VA. L.Q. 293 (1940).
Even though the court in the principal case found the most
recent law and the equities in favor of the railroad, consideration
was apparently not given to a constitutional provision which appears
to be directly applicable to the question in issue. W. VA. CoNsT. art.
XI, § 10, provides, "the legislature shall, in the law regulating railway companies, require railroads running through, or within a half
mile of a town or village, containing three hundred or more inhabitants, to establish stations for the accommodation of trade and travel
of said town or village."
The legislature has evidently attempted to comply with this
constitutional provision in enacting W. VA. CoDE. ch. 24, art. 3, § 1
(Michie 1955), which provides, "... . every railroad ... may be

required by the Commission to establish and maintain such suitable
public service facilities and conveniences as may be reasonable and
just.. ." It should be pointed out that the constitutional language
provides that the legislature "shall" require, whereas the statute uses
the words "may be required".
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It is submitted that, even though the court in the principal case
may have reached the most just and equitable decision, W. VA.
CONsT. airt XI, § 10, is applicable to the facts of the case and should
have been dealt with since the legislature has obviously left open
the way for the Public Service Commission and the supreme court
to apply a subjective test in determining when service may be
required or discontinued by a railroad.
J. E. J.

RFndi PROPERTY-RIG-TS OF BlEmAINDEaMEN AFrER SALE FOR
NONPAYrENT OF LIFE TENANT's TAXES.-W devised real estate to A

for life, remainder to P, the heirs of As body. A was named administrator, CTA, and registered the land for tax purposes as
"Estate of W" for the years 1929 through 1986. The land was sold
to C in 1986 under a tax sale, and, by successive conveyances, D
obtained title. P, the remaindermen, brought this suit for partition,
and alleged that any sale during the continuance of the life estate
was ineffective as to their interests, that the duty to pay the taxes
was on the life tenant, and that the interests of the remaindermen
were not affected by reason of the failure of the life tenant to pay
the taxes. Held, where the decedent's will devised land to certain persons for life with a remainder to the respective heirs of
their bodies, it was the duty of the life tenants to have the premises
listed and assessed in their names and it was also the duty of the
life tenants to pay the taxes assessed and levied against the premises,
and upon their failure to do so, only the interests of the life tenants
could be levied upon and sold to satisfy the delinquent taxes.
Taylor v. Jennings, 106 S.E.2d 891 (S.C. 1958).
To the West Virginia lawyer, this case is most interesting
when compared with the law prevailing in this state. Considering each of the many problems presented by this case, the first is
whether or not the land was properly registered. In West Virginia,
the registration statute provides that ".

.

. when the owner has

devised the lands or a freehold estate therein absolutely, such land
shall be charged to the devisee.
W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 4,
§ 12 (Michie 1955).
It is the duty of the owner of the land to have the premises
charged to himself and pay taxes thereon. Failure of the owner to
register the land and pay the taxes renders the land liable to be
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